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Abstract
We estimate the importance of preference interdependence from consump-
tion choices. Our strategy follows the literature that tests the constraints
imposed by optimality in the evolution of individual consumption. We de-
rive an Euler equation from a preference specification that allows for non-
separabilities across households and across time. The introduction of habits
and envy places additional restrictions on the evolution of the optimal con-
sumption path. We use a unique data set that follows a sample of 3,200
households for up to eight consecutive quarters to test these restrictions. Our
estimates suggest that, if one defines utility over consumption services, a large
fraction of these services is relative, with one fourth of the weight placed in
the consumption of the reference group and more than one third of the weight
placed on the agent’s past consumption.
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1 Introduction
The assumption that preferences are separable across time and across households
is standard in the economic literature, but it is not particularly appealing. Indeed,
social scientists have long stressed the relevance of habit and status-seeking as being
important characteristics of human behavior. In our discipline origins of this propo-
sition can be traced as far back as Smith (1759) and Veblen (1912), although it was
not until the works of Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1976) and Ryder and Heal (1973)
that an effort was made to provide these ideas with some micro-theoretic founda-
tions. The subsequent literature has associated two types of reference consumption
levels to these non-separabilities. The first is an internal criterion based on the
individual?s own past consumption levels. This case is often referred to as charac-
terizing ?habit formation”. The second is based on an external criterion, expressed
in terms of the consumption of some outside reference group, typically the average
consumption of the neigborhood, the community or the overall economy. This is
often referred to as “envy” as in Varian (1974), “catching up with the Joneses” as in
Abel (1990), “keeping up with the Joneses” as in Gali (1994), “status” as in Corneo
and Jeanne (2001), “jealousy” as in Dupor and Liu (2003) or ”rivalry” as in Bruni
and Porta (2005) or “consumption externalities” as in Liu and Turnovsky (2005).
A large body of empirical work investigates the importance of habit formation
for consumption behavior1. The point of departure in any of these studies is an
Euler equation derived under a preference specification that allows for temporal
interdependencies. Then, a linearized version of this equation is estimated using
time series data on consumption and asset returns. Using UK data, Osborn (1988)
introduces a consumption specification that allows for seasonal variation and habit
persistence and finds that the habit coefficients are jointly significant. Ferson and
Constantinides (1991) find evidence of habit persistence dominating durability at
monthly, quarterly and annual frequencies. Fuhrer and Klein (2006) and Fuhrer
1The introduction of habits in the standard consumption model induces agents to adjust slowly
to permanent income shocks and this helps rationalizing the reported excess smoothness puzzle.
See, for instance, Campbell and Deaton (1989). Furthermore, habit formation has been used to
reproduce the hump-shaped response of aggregate spending to monetary shocks (Fuhrer (2000)),
the link between saving and growth (Carroll et al. (2000)) and to improve the empirical fit of
business cycle models (Boldrin et al. (2001)).
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(2000) relying on a utility function that assigns relative weights to both current
consumption and an internal benchmark find that 80% of the weight should be at-
tached to the latter. Dynan (2000) uses panel data, specifically food consumption
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and finds no evidence of habit formation
at the annual frequency. As Carrasco et al. (2005) point out this result could be
a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity across households, and show that, after
controlling for fixed effects, food consumption and services exhibit habit formation.
Finally, following the revealed preference tradition, Crawford (2010) characterizes
a set of identifying restrictions for the habit formation model. His results suggest
that the introduction of habit formation in the standard discounted utility model
improves its explanatory power considerably, virtually to the point where 100% of
the micro-data are perfectly rationalizable if one allows intertemporal complemen-
tarities for many goods.
At the theoretical level, envy has been introduced to rationalize several depar-
tures from the predictions of the standard paradigm that assumes preferences are
separable across households. Abel (1990) and Gali (1994) rely on interpersonal
comparisons to account for the excess return on equity. Carroll et al. (2000) explore
the implications of relative consumption for the process of capital accumulation.
Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) study the impact of interpersonal comparisons in an
economy displaying dynastic altruism. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) present a model
of worker behavior where individual effort does not only depend on the workers’
own wage but also on the wage received by their coworkers. Liu and Turnovsky
(2005) explore the impact of envy on labor supply choices. Wendner and Goulder
(2008) find that the marginal excess burden from taxation is lower in the presence of
status concerns. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) find that the optimal tax policy in an
economy populated by envious households displays countercyclical Keynesian fea-
tures. Ng and Wang (1993) and Howarth (2006) explore the implications of envy for
environmental degradation and the use of natural resources. Despite this growing
theoretical literature there are very few attempts to provide econometric estimates
of the importance of envy. The asset pricing literature from Abel (1990) to Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) provides some indirect evidence on the relevance of an exter-
nally generated reference stock as a mean to rationalize the equity premium puzzle.
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Additional support for the importance of interpersonal comparisons is provided by
the recent literature on happiness. Clark and Oswald (1996), Luttmer (2005) and
Dynan and Ravina (2007) are just a few examples that stress the importance of
positional concerns as a crucial determinant of (self-reported) well-being. Oswald
(1997) concludes that evidence from psychology and experimental economics sup-
port the claim that satisfaction depends upon the agent’s relative position, again
emphasizing the role of positional externalities. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, Rav-
ina (2008) and Maurer and Meier (2008) are the only two studies that try to infer
the degree of envy using data on individual consumption choices.
Our goal is to assess the importance of both types of non-separabilities from ob-
served consumption choices. Where envy and habits matter, the level of satisfaction
derived from a given bundle of consumption depends, not only on the consumption
bundle itself, but also on how it compares to the bundle of consumption of some
reference group or to the agent?s own past bundle of consumption. In this context,
optimality imposes additional restrictions on the evolution of consumption through
time and across households. We exploit these restrictions to estimate the relative
importance of these two types of interactions; interdependence across time, habit for-
mation, and interdependence across households, envy2. Our results provide strong
support for preference specifications that allow for both types of non-separability.
Specifically, if one expresses utility derived from consumption services as a weighted
average of the absolute (current) level of consumption, the level of consumption
relative to that of the reference group, and the current level of consumption relative
to the past level of consumption, our estimates suggest that households derive one
third of their satisfaction from comparisons between their current and past consump-
tion and one forth from comparisons between their consumption and that of their
neighbours, with barely one half being determined by their current consumption
choices.
Our dataset, the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta
Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, ECPF), recently used by Browning and Col-
lado (2001); Collado and Browning (2007), Carrasco et al. (2005) and Crawford
2In contrast to the existing literature, with the sole exception of Ravina (2008), we consider
simultaneously the effects of both types of non-separability.
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(2010) has two important advantages over other datasets. First, its long time dimen-
sion with each household being followed up to eight consecutive quarters. Second,
the wealth of data on household geographical and socio-demographic characteristics
it includes. The long time dimension allows identifying the structural parameters in
the presence of fixed effects, while the presence of geographic data allows for a sen-
sible characterization of reference groups, that, similar to Frank (1985) and Ravina
(2008), we define as those households that live in the same area (census tract) as
the household of interest.
Finally, a crucial problem in the identification of models of social interactions
is related to the reflection problem (Manski 1993), recently stressed by Maurer and
Meier (2008) in a context similar to ours. A priori it is difficult to distinguish
whether similar behavior within a group arises from the interaction among group
members, endogenous effect, or simply results from common exogenous character-
istics of the group, exogenous effect, or from individuals within the group sharing
similar unobservable characteristics or facing similar shocks, correlated effect. Since
the construction of our reference group is based on a purely geographical criterion
established by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE) and, as we will argue, these
groups are not particularly homogeneous in terms of observable characteristics of
their members, one may think that the exogenous effects do not drive our estimate
for envy. Despite of this, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we include
the neighbours’ socio-economic characteristics as an additional regressor. Second,
we control for shocks at the census tract level including measures of the local un-
employment rate and the average interest rate faced by the reference group. Third,
we include in our preferred specification an alternative measure of envy based on a
reference group constructed using observable socio-demographic characteristics fol-
lowing Maurer and Meier (2008). Our baseline estimates remain robust throughout
these exercises.
Our work is closely related to Maurer and Meier (2008) and particularly to Rav-
ina (2008). The first authors propose a social multiplier approach to disentangle
consumption externalities from correlated effects. Using US data and a definition
of reference group that is based on socio-demographic, as opposed to geographic,
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characteristics, they report two main findings. First, much of the co-movement of
individual consumption within groups reflects correlated effects. Second, once they
control for these effects, they still find substantial evidence of consumption exter-
nalities. On the other hand, Ravina (2008) uses a sample of US credit-card holders
to conduct an exercise similar to ours. Nonetheless, several issues arise with her
credit card data. First, her measure of consumption is incomplete since it only in-
cludes purchases made with a single credit card. Second, it may include purchases of
durable consumption that will require an explicit modeling of consumption services.
Third, the use of this data requires assumptions on the separability of consumption
expenditures according to the method of payment, i.e. those paid with credit card
should be separable from those paid by other mean. A priori, these assumptions
are difficult to justify. In contrast, our dataset overcomes these shortcomings by
including a very comprehensive measure of consumption and a wide range of socio-
demographic and geographic characteristics that allow the construction of sensible
reference groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model
and derives our empirical specification. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4
presents the empirical strategy, while the main results are presented in Section 5.
The conclusions are summarized in Section 6, while the Appendices provide some
technical details.
2 Theoretical Background: A simple model with
envy and habits
Consider an endowment economy populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived house-
holds distributed along the unit interval. At time t the i − th household chooses
current consumption expenditures, Cit , to maximize,
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βsi u
(
C˜it+s;ψit+s
)]
(1)
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where βi is her subjective discount factor, C˜it are consumption services, and
ψit+s is a vector of variables that move marginal utility, “taste-shifters”. In order to
capture the importance of intertemporal and interpersonal comparisons we model
consumption services as 3,
C˜it = Cit − γC¯it − θCit−1 (2)
These services depend not only on the household’s current consumption expendi-
tures but also on the current consumption expenditures of her reference group and on
her own past consumption expenditures. Specifically γ measures the weight that the
agent places on the consumption of her reference group and therefore is our measure
of envy, while θ measures the importance of habits.
The individual budget constraint takes the standard form,
Ait+1 = Rit+1 (Ait + Yit − Cit) (3)
where Yit is current non-interest income, Ait+1 is next period wealth, and Rit+1
is the gross return on assets.
The first order condition for this optimization program, where uC˜it is the marginal
utility of consumption services for the i− th household at time t , is given by,
Et
[
uC˜it − βiθuC˜it+1
]
= Et
[
Rit+1βi
(
uC˜it+1 − βθuC˜it+2
)]
(4)
Under a constant return on wealth Deaton (1992) shows that (4) can be ex-
pressed as a second-order difference equation with the following familiar solution4,
3This additive specification of envy and habits has been widely used in different contexts (see
for instance Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000)). The literature has proposed an alternative modeling
strategy that assumes interdependencies enter in a multiplicative way (Abel 1990; Carroll et al.
2000). Appendix I shows that our estimation equation remains unchanged under this alternative
multiplicative approach.
4Hayashi (1985) proves that (5) holds approximately under static expectations on the evolution
of a time-varying return on wealth. See Appendix II for a detailed derivation of (5).
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uC˜it−1 = βiEt−1
[
Ritu
C˜
it
]
(5)
Now, let’s assume our instantaneous utility function takes the standard iso-
elastic specification,
u
(
C˜it;ψit
)
= eψit
(
C˜it
)1−σ
1− σ (6)
where σ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, governs the rate of change in
marginal utility. Replacing (6) in (5) we reach,
βiEt−1
[
Rite
ψ′it−ψ′it−1
(
C˜it
C˜it−1
)−σ]
= 1 (7)
We follow most of the literature by considering a log-linear approximation that,
under rational expectations, gives rise to our basic estimation equation5.
∆cit = µi +
1
σ
rit + γ∆c¯it + θ∆cit−1 + ∆ψit + εit where Et−1 (εit) = 0 (8)
where lower case variables stand for the log of the upper case variable, ∆ is the
difference operator, µi is a combination of the rate of time preference and higher
order terms resulting from the linear approximation6, and εit is an expectational
error uncorrelated with any information available at time t − 1 . The interpreta-
tion of (8) is straight forward. After controlling for the effect of taste-shifters, the
growth rate of consumption increases with the degree of patience captured by the
intercept, with anticipated changes on the return on saving as a consequence of
5An alternative approach, see for instance Carroll (2001) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
uses simulation techniques to estimate a structural model of intertemporal choices. As Attanasio
and Low (2004) point out this approach has its own limitations. Given this, and for ease of
comparability with most of the existing consumption literature, we will use a linear approximation
of (7).
6We are implicitly assuming that these higher order terms are constant and therefore captured
by the intercept. Alternatively we could assume that the innovations to the higher moments are
uncorrelated with the other regressors. In this case the deviations from the mean of these higher
order moments will be captured by the error term.
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intertemporal substitution, with the growth rate of consumption of the reference
group as a consequence of envy, and with the past growth rate of the agent’s con-
sumption as a consequence of habit formation. It is worth noticing that if envy and
habit do not matter, γ = θ = 0 , (8) reduces to the permanent income hypothesis
under time separable preferences and time-varying interest rate as stated by Hall
and Mishkin (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1991). Alternatively if we set γ = 0
our specification reduces to the one used by Dynan (2000).
The estimation of (8) faces several challenges. First, consumption data is poorly
measured. Second, time averaging may induce first-order serial correlation in con-
sumption growth that may resemble habit formation. Third, some regressors may
be endogenous. And fourth, individual choices may be affected by aggregate shocks.
Nonetheless, we leave the discussion of these issues for the section on empirical
strategy, and now we turn to describe our data.
3 The data
The estimation of (8) requires data on household consumption where the same
sample of households is followed for several consecutive periods. To implement the
model we use twelve years (1985-1996) of the Spanish Household Budget Continuous
Survey (Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, ECPF). The ECPF is a
rotating panel based on a survey conducted by the Spanish National Statistics Office
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, INE). The ECPF interviews a sample of 3,200
households every quarter, randomly rotating 12.5% of them each quarter. As a
result, we can follow a household for a maximum of eight consecutive quarters.
This survey has several advantages compared to other datasets commonly used
in the consumption literature such as the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID)
and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the US or the Family Expenditure
Survey (FES) for the UK. The PSID only reports information on food consumption,
not allowing to control for other goods which may well be non-separable from food.
The FES interviews each household only once and therefore it lacks the time-series
dimension required for the estimation of (8). The CEX, although it reports various
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consumption categories, only follows each household for four quarters. In contrast,
the ECPF reports a complete measure of consumption expenditures, follows each
household for a long period of time (twice as many quarters as the CEX), and more
importantly includes very detailed geographical information on the area of residence
for each family. This longer panel structure allows to control for fixed effects and
to construct an adequate set of instruments, while the geographical information is
crucial for the construction of the reference groups7 .
The original dataset includes 30,133 households (148,482 observations). Since,
as we will argue, we need lagged variables as instruments for our estimation, we se-
lect households reporting full information for at least four consecutive quarters8. In
line with most of the consumption literature, we restrict our sample to married cou-
ples with or without children, and drop households whose head is either very young
(younger than 18) or old (older than 65). This process leaves us with 15,094 house-
holds (95,643 observations). Once we transform the variables for estimation, i.e. we
take all the lags and differences, our working sample contains 35,957 observations
on 12,064 households9 Table 1 summarizes this data cleaning process.
We construct our dependent variable, total consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods and services, as the sum of food, alcohol, tobacco, services, and expen-
ditures on other nondurable goods, such as heating fuel, public and private transport,
personal care and semi-durable goods like clothing and footwear. This measure of
consumption accounts for roughly 80% of total consumption expenditures and its
time path is similar to consumption expenditures obtained from national accounts.
In order to express nominal expenditures in real terms we construct a household
specific price index. This index is an average of the nominal price of each category
of goods used in the construction of the CPI weighted by each household’s share of
expenditure in each category. Our measure for the nominal interest rate comes from
7For a complete description of the ECPF see Browning and Collado (2001), Carrasco et al.
(2005) or Crawford (2010)
8We could select those households with eight consecutive quarters in order to simplify the
estimation. However, due to some evidence of attrition in the sample, we use the unbalanced panel
in the estimation process.
9The drop from 15,094 households to 12,064 households is a consequence of missing data on
some of the exogenous variables.
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the 12-month non-transferable deposit rate reported by the Bank of Spain. We use
household specific inflation rates to calculate the real rate of return on wealth.
The specification of the reference groups is a crucial task for our empirical analy-
sis. As Manski (1993) points out “inference is not possible unless the researcher has
prior information specifying the composition of reference groups”. In an ideal envi-
ronment, the researcher would use observed behaviour and infer the most relevant
determinants of reference groups. Since the data requirements for this endogenous
determination of reference groups are prohibitively demanding, the literature has
opted for two alternative approaches. A first approach follows the lead of the so-
ciological literature on peer effects (Festinger 1954; Kapteyn 1997). These authors
suggest that people primarily compare themselves to members of their own social
group, who are individuals with similar age, gender or education. This is the ap-
proach followed by Maurer and Meier (2008) that construct reference groups based
on attributes of the head of the household; age, race, gender, family status, edu-
cational attainment, occupational status and size of the nearest city. Under this
approach it is reasonable to ask whether the observed common behaviour is the
result of social interactions or simply results from common characteristics. A sec-
ond approach stresses the importance of the visibility of consumption expenditures
as an important determinant of envious choices Charles et al. (2009) and Heffetz
(2011). As Frank (1985) points out evolutionary psychology calls attention to the
fact that the relevant reproductive battles were typically decided by competitive
balance in highly local environments. This literature suggests that geographical
proximity should be an important determinant of reference groups10 . Following
Dynan and Ravina (2007) we construct our reference groups using this second ap-
proach, although we conduct robustness checks including an alternative reference
group constructed following the first approach.
We, therefore, identify reference groups with census tracts. These tracts are spa-
tial, small, and permanent statistical subdivisions of the Spanish territory. Census
tract boundaries are delineated with the intention of being maintained over a long
10This criterion for the determination of the reference group is by no means exclusive. There
might be other relevant approaches to construct reference groups or other relevant reference groups.
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period of time so that statistical comparisons can be made from census to census.
The 8,000 Spanish municipalities are divided into 35,000 census tracts. These tracts
are grouped into provinces and strata that depend on the size of the municipality to
which they belong. To collect data for the ECPF, the INE chooses a representative
sample of 584 tracts spread over all strata. The number of census tracts chosen for
each of the 17 Autonomous Communities (Spanish regions) is proportional to its
population with a minimum of 16 tracts for each region.
In our estimation, the reference group of any given household is composed by the
other households that live in the same census tract. For each household, we construct
the consumption of her reference group, the neighbourhood consumption, as the
average (log) consumption of her census tract excluding her own (log) consumption
expenditures11. It is worth noticing that as opposed to Ravina (2008), who uses
cities of residence as reference groups, our approach allows for a more exhaustive
dissection of spatial interactions. For instance, a city like Madrid, with more than
three million inhabitants, will be broken down into more than 50 reference groups.
Finally, we use several socio-demographic variables, such as age, labour market
status, and number of adults and children in our estimation. Tables 2 and 3 describe
the construction of all these variables and provide summary statistics including
measures of the size of our reference groups.
4 Identification and Empirical Strategy
The estimation of our empirical model, (8), presents several challenges that influ-
ence our strategies and choice of techniques. The life-cycle literature on consump-
tion has identified several factors that affect the level of satisfaction derived from
a given bundle of consumption, and hence the optimal consumption path. For in-
stance, Attanasio and Browning (1995) highlight several observable demographic
characteristics and Carrasco et al. (2005) show the importance of controlling for
11We have chosen mean consumption of the reference group but one might think that neighbour-
hood effects might be transmitted by distributional features other than the mean. For example, it
is easy to believe that the magnitude of envy on individual behaviour may depend on the dispersion
of behaviour in the reference group; for instance the smaller the dispersion, the stronger the norm.
12
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across households while estimating Euler
equations. Following this work, we use the taste-shifters from our theoretical model
(ψit) to capture these household specific factors. These factors include a set of ob-
servables: age (ageit) and age-squared (age
2
it) of the head of the household, number
of adults (nadultit) and number of children (nchildit) in the household. We also
allow for unobservable household specific tastes (which we assume to be constant)
by introducing fixed family effects (ωi) and a purely random error (υit) . As a result,
ψit = β1ageit + β2age
2
it + β3nadultit + β4nchildit + ωi + υit (9)
Furthermore, as Attanasio and Low (2004) point out, under rational expecta-
tions the average of (8) across time is zero for each household, but in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks the cross-sectional mean of these deviations could differ
from zero at any point in time. Nonetheless under the assumption that aggregate
shocks affect all families in a similar way, we capture the effects of these shocks by
introducing annual and quarterly dummies12 (λt) in our estimation equation
13.
Finally, Deaton (1992) questions the standard assumption about separability
between leisure and consumption that underlies our theoretical model14 . Therefore,
we try to attenuate its effects by controlling for the change in labour market status
(∆LMit). As a result (8) becomes,
∆cit = µi+
1
σ
rit+γ∆c¯it+θ∆cit−1+β′∆ψit+λt+β5∆LMit+ε′it Et−1 (ε
′
it) = 0 (10)
12We also include quarterly dummies to control seasonal differences in consumption. This set of
dummies captures observed seasonal differences (Browning and Collado 2001)
13Although it is equivalent to market completeness, our assumption about the effects of aggregate
shocks is somewhat less restrictive. Furthermore, using PSID data, Runkle (1991) finds that
aggregate shocks are not very important for individual consumption choices. Collado (1998) obtains
a similar result using the ECPF. Similarly, Pischke (1995) finds that aggregate fluctuations account
for a very small share of individual uncertainty. The former two authors suggest that time dummies
properly capture the effects of aggregate shocks, which are not captured by fluctuations in the
interest rate.
14Kiley (2010), using techniques that are robust in the presence of weak instruments, finds little
support for non-separable preferences between consumption and leisure in explaining consumption
fluctuations.
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To sum up, we have taken care of heterogeneity in observable family character-
istics, in unobservable time-invariant tastes, of the effects of aggregate shocks and
seasonal differences in consumption and labour market participation.
Although our estimation equation seems to include most of the factors that
the literature highlights as determinants of consumption growth, we still face two
problems when trying to estimate (10) even under rational expectations. First, un-
observable individual effects may be correlated with the lag in consumption growth.
Second, there may be some correlation between our regressors and the error term.
For example, the real interest rate and the change in labour market status are
unknown at time t, and therefore likely to be correlated with the forecast error.
Additionally, like with other consumption data, measurement errors are likely to
be prevalent in our habit and envy variables15. Table 4 reports a negative auto-
correlation in consumption growth that suggests the presence of measurement error
and possibly the effects of time averaging of the data (Heaton 1993). We can deal
with the first problem by first differencing equation (10), though we generate an
error with an order-one moving-average structure, which is correlated with the first
differences of lagged consumption growth16. The second problem will require the
use of instrumental variables.
Equation (10) contains several endogenous regressors; in particular, the real
interest rate, the change in labour market status, the growth rate of consumption
and, possibly, our measure of envy. Under the restrictions imposed by rational
expectations, any variable known at time t will be orthogonal to the error term,
and thereby a valid instrument. The high level of persistence of these endogenous
15Notice that our envy variable is calculated as the (log) average of the individual levels of
consumption within a census tract (excluding the household of interest). Therefore, if measurement
error is classical and the tract is large enough, these errors will cancel out through the averaging
process. Nevertheless, since the average census tract contains 5 households, caution suggests that
we should work under the assumption that measurement errors might still be an issue for our envy
variable.
16It is also possible that the unobservables ε′it are correlated within group, and thereby correlated
with ∆cit . Under the assumption that these group specific shocks are time-invariant, we can control
for them adding group dummies into equation (10). However, the first-difference of the resulting
equation would be identical to that of (10). Furthermore, our robustness checks control for the
unemployment rate at the census tract level that is likely to capture the effects of time-varying
group specific shocks.
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regressors suggests that lagged variables should perform well as instruments. This
point has been stressed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995)
becoming the standard criterion for the selection of instruments in the estimation of
consumption Euler equations (see, for instance, Dynan (2000), Carrasco et al. (2005)
and Maurer and Meier (2008)). As a result, apart from all exogenous variables, we
use the lag of the household specific real interest rate, the lag of labour market
status of the head of the household, the lags of the number of adults and number
of children, and the second lag of the growth rate of consumption of the reference
group as instruments17 . In addition to the first stage regressions, we report various
tests of under-identification, over-identification and weak instruments that confirm
the validity of our set of instruments, as we will discuss in the next section18.
Finally, Manski (1993) discusses confounding difficulties in estimating the (en-
dogenous) effect of peer-group’s behaviour on individual choices (in our context,
the effect of ∆c¯it on ∆cit). He argues that, in addition to the endogenous effect,
individuals in the same group may behave similarly because of common exogenous
or socio-economic characteristics of the group (exogenous effects) or because they
have similar individual unobservable characteristics or face the same shocks (corre-
lated effects). To deal with the exogenous effect we follow two alternative strategies.
First, we include the mean of socio-economic characteristics of the reference group
as control variables (number of adults, number of children, age, educational level
and real disposable income). Second, we explore the degree of heterogeneity in the
(observable) characteristics of the households within and across reference groups
using a simple exercise. We randomly draw a household in each reference group
in a given period. Then, we pair the head of that household with the head of an-
other household, also randomly selected, from (1) the same reference group, (2) a
different reference group controlling for the size of the municipality of residence,
and (3) a different reference group regardless of municipality size. We repeat this
experiment 100,000 times. Table 5 reports the percentage of such pairing with the
17Notice that the autocorrelation induced by time-aggregation and measurement errors requires
the use of twice lagged endogenous variables as instruments.
18We have experimented including other instruments such as ∆cit−1 , ageit−1 and age2it−1 in
our regressions. However, they failed the difference-in-Sargan C-test suggesting that they are not
a valid set of instruments.
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same characteristics between (1) and (2) (and (1) and (3)). Among the pairs of
household heads in the same reference groups, roughly one-fourth of them were in
the same age group and had the same number of children. About one-third were in
the same income bracket and half of them shared levels of education and occupa-
tional category. The pairing of household heads in different reference groups yields
only slightly lower percentages. For example, 26.6% of the pairing within the same
reference groups had the two household heads in the same age group, and the figure
was 24.3% for the pairing of heads in different reference groups (regardless of the
municipality size). The results, therefore, suggest that although household heads in
the same reference groups were more likely to share some common characteristics
than those in different reference groups, the difference, if not negligible, does not
seem to be significant19.Finally, to attenuate the impact of common shocks at the
census tract level, correlated effects, we include the local unemployment rate and
the average interest rate faced by the reference group as additional regressors.
5 Empirical Findings
Our basic results are presented in Table 6. The first column reports OLS estimates.
The second column reports OLS estimates obtained in first differences that account
for unobserved heterogeneity. In line with Carrasco et al. (2005), the comparison of
these results, which are only valid if the regressors are strictly exogenous, suggests
the importance of correlated fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 report GMM and LIML
estimates, once we control for the endogeneity of the regressors.
To test the validity of the instruments described in the previous section we con-
duct tests for under-identification, over-identification and weak instruments. The
19In general, in the absence of correlated effects, the endogenous effect will be identified when
the exogenous characteristics of the reference group do not affect individual behavior. Appendix
III shows, in a simplified linear version of our model, that this is the case for equation (10) as long
as ∆c¯it−1 does not enter directly into our estimation equation, i.e. if the frequency of the data
induces a contemporaneous relation between the consumption of an individual and her reference
group rather than a lagged one. Ravina (2008), using quarterly data, introduces the lag of envy in
her basic regression and finds that the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
Additionally, the non-linearity between ∆cit and ∆c¯it in our model further attenuates the impact
of the endogenous effect.
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model is not rejected either by the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic or the Hansen J
statistic20 . The statistic for the Kleibergen-Paap LM test has a value of 22.91 (chi-
square 2 degrees of freedom) rejecting the null hypothesis of under-identification at
any level of significance. The Hansen J statistic of overidentifying restrictions (0.694
for the GMM estimation and 0.677 for the LIML with 1 degree of freedom) confirms
the validity of the instruments at standard significance levels and the correct ex-
clusion of certain instruments from the estimated equation. Our set of instruments
passes the under-identification and over-identification tests, but GMM regressions
still might suffer from the weak instruments problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
If this is the case, the sampling distribution of GMM statistics is non-normal and
standard GMM point estimates, hypothesis tests and confidence intervals are unre-
liable. Table 7 reports a summary of the results for first-stage regressions. Following
Angrist and Pischke (2008) we report first-stage chi-squared and F statistics tests.
These results suggest that neither our instruments are weak nor our model is under-
identified. Besides, the joint-significant Angrist-Pischke F-statistics of the first stage
regression confirm the suitability of our instruments. Finally, as an additional check
of the adequacy of the GMM estimates, we have also computed the LIML estimation
(that performs better than other methods under weak instruments) without finding
significant differences with the GMM estimates. Taking together this evidence sug-
gests that, once one accounts for the potential effects of unobserved heterogeneity,
misspecification, if any, does not seem to be severe.
Now we turn to the interpretation of our results. At first glance our estimates
have the sign predicted by theory and their magnitudes lie in reasonable ranges.
Additionally, the robust standard errors reported in parentheses suggest that most of
the coefficients of interest are estimated with reasonable precision. Our estimate for
the coefficient on the real interest rate, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
is around 0.2 with a standard error of 0.05221 . This value is similar in magnitude
to those from previous studies, for instance Attanasio and Weber (1995) report
20We have also conducted the C-statistic which proves the goodness of an excluded subset of
instruments (the first lag of the difference of number of children and number of adults) reject the
null hypothesis that both the smaller set of instruments and the additional are valid.
21Notice that, as long as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is small, the estimates on the
envy and habit parameters from the additive specification, (8), have the same magnitudes as the
ones derived from the multiplicative specification presented in Appendix I (see equation (A1-3)).
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estimates that range from 0.149 to 0.480. Furthermore, our estimate lies between
previous values found under interdependent preferences, for instance Maurer and
Meier (2008) finds an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.1 and Ravina
(2008) reports an estimate close to 0.8. The coefficients on the number of adults and
children are both positive and highly significant throughout all of our specifications.
As expected, the former point estimate is larger than the latter. Our coefficients
on age and age-squared are both significant and consistent with the hump-shaped
profile of consumption through the life cycle reported by Attanasio and Browning
(1995) among others. The coefficient on the change in labour market status is not
statistically different from zero. This suggests that either non-separabilities are not
very relevant in our sample or that our labour market variable, which only includes
changes in labour market status rather than in hours worked, does not exhibit
enough variability to precisely estimate their effects. Similar to previous studies
that use our dataset, such as Collado (1998), aggregate shocks do not seem to be
very important for individual consumption choices since there are no significant
differences among the magnitude of the time dummies.
When we use OLS (columns 1 and 2), ignoring measurement errors and endo-
geneity, the resulting estimates of envy and habits present biases consistent with
the problems discussed in the previous section. On the one hand, our coefficient of
habits has the opposite sign than expected as a result of the negative autocorrela-
tion induced by measurement errors or time averaging of consumption data. On the
other hand, our coefficient of envy, although positive and significant, is relatively
small, and therefore of limited economic interest. Once we instrument our endoge-
nous regressors, using GMM (column 3) and LIML (column 4), our estimates for
envy and habits reveal the importance of preference interdependence for individual
consumption choices. The coefficient on the change in consumption of the reference
group, our measure of envy, is in the order of 0.22 and statistically significant at the
5% level. The coefficient on the change in past individual consumption, our mea-
sure of habits, is between 0.32 and 0.35 and significant at the 10% level. In order to
interpret the economic meaning of these coefficients, it is helpful to think in terms
of the multiplicative specification of consumption services discussed in Appendix
I. In this context, consumption services can be expressed as a weighted average of
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the absolute (current) level of consumption, the level of consumption relative to
the reference group and the current level of consumption relative to the past level
of consumption where the weights are given by our estimates of envy and habits.
Specifically our estimates suggest that, on average, households derive one fourth of
their consumption services from comparisons between their consumption and that of
their neighbours, one third of their consumption services from comparisons between
their current and past consumption, with only the remaining consumption services
being determined by their current level of consumption.
Next we explore the robustness of our estimate of envy to the problems discussed
by Manski (1993), particularly the presence of exogenous and correlated effects. To
control for exogenous effects, the second column of Table 8 includes as additional
regressors the means of the number of adults, number of children, age, educational
level and income of the reference group. The resulting estimate of envy barely
changes suggesting that our baseline result does not seem to be driven by exogenous
effects. In order to control for correlated effects, the third column of Table 8 includes
a measure of the unemployment rate calculated at the census tract level and the
interest rate of the reference group. Once more, the robustness of our envy estimate
seems to suggest that local shocks are not responsible for the co-movement in the
changes of individual consumption within reference groups reported in our baseline
estimation.
Now we compare our estimates of habits and envy with previous results. Meghir
and Weber (1996), using the US CEX, and Dynan (2000), using the PSID, do not find
evidence of habit formation. In the first study, the short time-dimension of the CEX
does not allow to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Carrasco et al.
(2005), using the ECPF, find that when time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
across households is not taken into account preferences seem to be inter-temporally
separable. However, once fixed effects are controlled for, their results provide strong
evidence of habit formation for food consumption and services, with estimates of 0.7
and 0.14 respectively. Contrary to Naik and Moore (1996), Dynan (2000) does not
find evidence of habit formation in her analysis of food consumption. As argued by
Ravina (2008) this failure to detect habit formation may arise from the limited set
19
of instruments available to Dynan, particularly the absence of a household-specific
interest rate. Ravina (2008) reports an estimate for habit formation in the range
of 0.5 and one for envy close to 0.3. These estimates are consistent with the ones
reported in our preferred specification. Finally, and despite of the fact that they
define their reference groups in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (while
ours are based on geographic characteristics), our estimates of envy are consistent
with those reported by Maurer and Meier (2008) that range from 0.11 to 0.44. This
last study proposes a social multiplier approach to disentangle true consumption
externalities from merely correlated effects.
It is also reassuring that our estimates on envy are of similar magnitude as those
found recently by the experimental literature. For instance the experiments reported
by Alpizar et al. (2005) suggest a mean degree of envy that varies between 0.2 and
0.5 depending on the characteristics of the consumption good.
Finally as we conduct several additional checks using alternative reference groups.
We report these results in Table 9. First, along the lines of Maurer and Meier
(2008) we construct a reference group using socio-demographic characteristics. In
particular, we use sex, education, age, employment status, location of the house-
hold and number of children to create 128 reference groups22. Column 2 reports
the estimated envy coefficient replacing our geographical reference group with the
socio-demographic one. The estimated coefficient for this alternative reference group
is not significant. In Column 3 we consider both reference groups simultaneously.
The socio-demographic one still remains non-significant while the coefficient on the
geographical one does not change neither on magnitude no in significance confirm-
ing not only our benchmark results but also our characterization of the reference
group. Second, since one can argue that the estimated effect of envy on individual
consumption might be spurious, we randomly allocate a reference group to each
household excluding its own geographical reference group. Column 4 reports the
22The educational variable distinguishes primary and below from secondary and above levels;
age considers the age of the head of household in the following intervals [18-35], [36-45], [46-55] and
[56-65]; employment status discriminate between employment and self-employment; the location
variable separates rural from urban households and the number of children distinguish families
with one children or less from the rest of families.
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average coefficient for envy after running 1000 replications using this random refer-
ence group while Column 5 reports the estimates for envy using both the random
reference group and our geographical one. These results are reassuring for our basic
results. The coefficient on the random reference group is not significant while the
coefficient on the geographical one maintains the same size and significance than
our benchmark estimation23.
23Additionally we have tested whether the inclusion of income (excess sensitivity of consumption
or presence of liquidity constraints) affects the results. Our benchmark estimates are robust to
this inclusion
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6 Conclusions
In recent years there has been a growing interest in preference specifications that
allow for non-separabilities across time and individuals. We have used data on con-
sumption choices to explore the empirical relevance of these specifications. Our
estimates of envy and habits are not only statistically significant but also economi-
cally important suggesting that a proper understanding of individual consumption
choices requires taking into account at least a partial history of individual consump-
tion choices and the choices of others. As Attanasio (1999) points out “it is from
consumption that, in all likelihood, utility and welfare are in large part determined”
and along these lines our estimates suggest that if we define preferences over con-
sumption services, households derive almost 25% of these services from comparisons
between their consumption and that of their neighbours, around 35% from compar-
isons between their current and past consumption, with the remaining 40% being
determined by their current consumption choices.
Our results, derived from explicit consumption choices, complement the large
body of empirical evidence that stresses the importance of interpersonal comparisons
for self-reported well-being that dates back, at least, to Easterlin (1974). Further-
more, our results have important policy implications. On the one hand, a proper
characterization of the determinants of consumption services is crucial for the type
of welfare welfare analyses popularized after Lucas (1987). On the other hand,
it is well known that the presence of consumption externalities, envy, distorts the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and other sources of utility, such
as leisure (Liu and Turnovsky (2005)), human capital formation (Moav and Neeman
(2010)), bequests (Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2011a)) or effort in the extraction
of non-renewable natural resources (Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2011b)). As a
result envious households tend to over-consume at the expense of those other activi-
ties, i.e. working longer hours, accumulating too little human capital, reducing their
saving for bequest motives, or exhausting the natural resource. Along these lines,
our estimates, together with those of Ravina (2008) and Maurer and Meier (2008),
provide a valuable guide for the design of optimal fiscal interventions to internalize
the impact of envy, as discussed by Wendner and Goulder (2008).
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Finally, in a natural follow up to this project, we plan to explore the extent of in-
terdependencies at a more disaggregated level. Following the work of Heffetz (2011)
that finds that income elasticities can be predicted from the degree of positionality
of consumer expenditures, we plan to use our rich dataset, which includes detailed
information on over 200 expenditure categories, to narrow down the specific sources
of envy and habits.
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Appendices
Appendix I: A model with multiplicative interdependencies.
Following Abel (1990) and Carroll et al. (2000) consider the problem explored in
Section 2 under the assumption that the consumption services for the i−th household
in period t are given by the following multiplicative specification of consumption
services,
C˜it =
Cit
C¯γitC
θ
it−1
= (Cit)
1−γ−θ
(
Cit
C¯it
)γ (
Cit
Cit−1
)θ
(A1-1)
Combining (A1-1) with (6) the solution to this program yields an Euler equation
that relates current and past consumption of the household and her reference group
according to,
1 = βiEt−1
[(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ (
C¯it
C¯it−1
)−γ(1−σ)(
Cit−1
Cit−2
)−θ(1−σ)
Rit
]
(A1-2)
Considering a log-linear approximation and assuming expectations are formed ra-
tionally we reach,
∆cit = µi+
1
σ
rit+
γ (σ − 1)
σ
∆c¯it+
θ (σ − 1)
σ
∆cit+∆ψit+εit Et−1 (ε′it) = 0 (A1-3)
which is the multiplicative counterpart of our basic estimation equation.
Appendix II: Derivation of equation (5)
Under the assumption that the interest rate it constant, we follow Deaton (1992)
to express equation (4) as a second order difference equation using the lead operator,
F , as follows
uC˜it−βi (θ +Ri)Et
[
FuC˜it
]
+β2i θRiEt
[
F 2uC˜it
]
= uC˜it (1− βiRiEt [F ]) (1− βiθEt [F ]) = 0
(A2-1)
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We can rule out the unstable solution associated with the second root using the
transversality condition, since βiθ > 0 . The stable solution that corresponds to the
first root is equivalent to (5).
Appendix III: Derivation of model restrictions
Let’s assume a general linear version of equation (10) is as follows,
∆Cit = µ+
1
σ
rit + γ∆C¯it + θ∆Cit−1 + η1∆C¯it−1 + η2r¯it + uit (A3-1)
where Cit is the household consumption (whereas cit in equation (10) is the
logarithm of household consumption) and ∆C¯it is the average consumption of the
reference group, 1
NG
∑
j∈G
∆Cjt , indexed by G (while in equation (10) is ∆c¯it is the
logarithm of the average consumption of the reference group, ln
(
1
NG−1
∑
j∈G−i
∆Cjt
)
. This leads to
∆C¯it = µ+
1
σ
r¯it + γ∆C¯it + θ∆C¯it−1 + η1∆C¯it−1 + η2r¯it + u¯it =
µ
1− γ +
1/σ + η2
1− γ r¯it +
θ + η1
1− γ ∆C¯it−1 +
1
1− γ u¯it
(A3-2)
Plugging the expression of (A3-2) back into equation (A3-1), we have
∆Cit =
µ
1− γ+
η1 + θγ
1− γ ∆C¯it−1+
η2 + γ/σ
1− γ r¯it+θ∆Cit−1+
1
σ
rit+
γ
1− γ u¯it+uit (A3-3)
To be able to identify our envy parameter, γ , we need to have either of the
following restriction: (i) η1 = 0 , i.e. ∆C¯it−1 does not enter equation (A3-1); or (ii)
η2 = 0 , i.e. r¯it does not enter equation (A3-1). This second condition additionally
requires that the individual interest rate rit enters equation (A3-1). Given that
our estimation equation meets both conditions the coefficient on envy is properly
identified. Finally, it is worth noticing that when γ = 0, equations (A3-1) and
(A3-3) are the same.
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Appendix IV: First-stage regressions
Variables rit ∆c¯it ∆cit−1 Labour Change
∆nadult 0.020*** -0.009 0.003 -0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
∆nchildren 0.012 -0.014 0.002 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
∆Age 0.004 -0.006 -0.032** -0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
∆Age2 -0.039 0.070 0.301* 0.173
(0.087) (0.099) (0.162) (0.147)
rit−1 -0.575*** 0.005 0.122*** 0.000
(0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
∆c¯it−2 0.016*** 0.143*** -0.054*** 0.008**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Lag1.∆nchildren 0.011 -0.006 0.044*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)
Lag1.∆nadult 0.007 -0.001 0.053*** -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Lag1.Labour Change -0.004 0.006 0.009 -0.428***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
2. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3. Seasonal and annual dummies are included in all the regressions.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection and data cleaning
Number Number
Criterion of Households of Observations
Whole sample 30,133 148,482
Less than 4 qrts of participation (9,977) (17,760)
<18 years old or >65 y.o (4,332) (30,280)
Single (730) (4,799)
Final Sample 15,094 95,643
Differences 12,064 35,957
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Table 2: Description of the variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Economics Variables
∆cit Household Non-Durable Consumption
Growth Rate
ECPF
Household’s expenditures in goods and services.
In particular, it includes the sum of food, alco-
hol, tobacco and expenditures on other nondurable
goods, such as services, heating fuel, public and
private transport, personal care and semi-durable
goods like clothing and footwear. We construct
growth rate by taking the difference in the loga-
rithms of this variable between time t and (t-1).
∆c¯it Reference Group Household Non-Durable
Consumption Growth Rate
ECPF
The log differences of average consumption of her
census tract excluding her own consumption ex-
penditures.
yit Real Disposable Income ECPF
rit Household Real Interest Rate Authors’ Calculations
Computed as: rit = Rt − piit
Rt 12 Month Non-Transferable Deposit Interest Rate Bank of Spain
piit Household Inflation Rate Authors’ Calculation
Computed as: piit =
P ∗it−P ∗it−1
P ∗it−1
Where P ∗it =
∑
j
P jt w
j
it
P jt Nominal Price of Commodity j Spanish National
Statistics Institute
wjit Weight of commodity j in the i household budget Authors’ Calculations
Sociodemographic Variables
nadult Number of Adults ECPF
nchildren Number of Children (Less than 14 years old) ECPF
dlabourchange Dummy of Change of the Head of Household
Labour status
ECPF
EducationLevel Educational Level ECPF
age Head of Household Years Old ECPF
hsex Sex of Head of Household ECPF
drura Dummy for Cities with Less than 10,000 citizens ECPF
dheduc Dummy for families whose head of household has
Graduate Educational Level
ECPF
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Whole Sample Sample Selected
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Economics Variables
cit (real non durable consumption) €2,835 €1,913 €3,146 €1,870
rit (real interest rate) 10.7% 3.6 % 10.7% 3.6%
yit (real income) €3,277 €2,208 €3,622 €2,214
Sociodemographic Variables
nadult 2.7 1.2 3.1 1.2
nchildren 1.6 1.4 2 1.3
age 52.8 15.4 46.6 11.2
hsex(male) 82% 86%
drura 28% 27%
dheduc 8% 8.3%
Reference Group No. of Groups Mean Size Median Size
584 5.43 5
Table 4: Autocorrelations
∆cit ∆cit−1 ∆cit−2 ∆cit−3
∆cit 1
∆cit−1 -0.4444 1
∆cit−2 -0.0299 -0.4471 1
∆cit−3 -0.0384 -0.0281 -0.4421 1
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Table 5: Heterogeneity in observables characteristics within and across reference
groups
No. of
Pairing of heads of households in Age children Income Education Occupation
% of pairing with same characteristics
Same reference group 26.6 24.9 35.1 55.7 48.6
Different ref. group, same city size 24.7 23.5 29.9 46.0 44.2
Different ref. group regardless of city size 24.3 23.5 29.2 44.0 42.5
36
Table 6: Basic Estimation
Variables OLS-POOL FD-OLS FD-GMM FD-LIML
∆c¯it 0.073*** 0.054*** 0.224** 0.236**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.103) (0.106)
∆cit−1 -0.434*** -0.626*** 0.316* 0.350*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.162) (0.166)
rit 0.004** 0.058*** 0.197*** 0.205***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.052) (0.054)
∆nadult 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013)
∆nchildren 0.048*** 0.027*** 0.039** 0.041**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017)
∆Age 0.025** 0.021** 0.046** 0.048**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
∆Age2 -0.233** -0.188 -0.428** -0.441**
(0.108) (0.115) (0.217) (0.220)
LabourChange -0.011** -0.012** -0.017 -0.01
(0.005) (0.006) (0.027) (0.028)
Seasonaldummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,378 50,378 35,957 35,957
Number of Households 12,064 12,064
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistics
Underidentification test 22.91*** 22.91***
Hansen J statistic
Overidentification test 0.694*** 0.677***
C-statistic+ 0.694*** 0.677***
Notes.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
2. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3. Instrumented variables:∆cit−1, ∆c¯it, Labour Change and rit
4. Instruments sets:lag rit, lag2 ∆c¯it, lag ∆nadult, lag ∆nchildren and lag LabourChange
5. Excluded variables in the C-statistic: lag of ∆nadult, lag ∆nchildren
6. Seasonal and annual dummies are included in all the regressions.
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Table 7: Summary results for Angrist-Pischke first-stage regressions
(Underid) (Weak id)
Variable F( 5, 35934)) P-val AP Chi-sq( 2) P-val AP F( 2, 35934)) P-val
rit 378.06 0.0000 1076.00 0.0000 537.66 0.0000
∆c¯it 129.50 0.0000 289.06 0.0000 144.44 0.0000
∆cit−1 54.73 0.0000 25.46 0.0000 12.72 0.0000
Labour Change 248.95 0.0000 1230.76 0.0000 614.99 0.0000
Note.
1. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments: F( 5, 35934)) = 274.43 Prob> F = 0.0000
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Table 8: Robustness Checks I
Variables Baseline (2) (3)
∆c¯it 0.224** 0.213** 0.221**
(0.103) (0.098) (0.098)
∆cit−1 0.316* 0.143* 0.145*
(0.132) (0.089) (0.088)
rit 0.197*** 0.211*** 0.212***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.055)
∆nadult 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.053***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
∆nchildren 0.039** 0.035** 0.034**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
∆Age 0.046** 0.040** 0.039**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
∆Age2 -0.428** -0.359* -0.358*
(0.217) (0.197) (0.198)
Labour Change -0.017 -0.021 -0.021
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
∆nadult -0.042* -0.044*
(0.023) (0.023)
∆nchildren 0.004 0.005
(0.015) (0.015)
∆Age 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
∆Education Level -0.019* -0.022*
(0.011) (0.011)
∆y¯it -0.035*** -0.030***
(0.011) (0.010)
∆Unemployment Rate -0.021
(0.030)
r¯it -0.039***
(0.012)
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,957 32,483 32,483
Number of Households 12,064 11,053 11,053
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistics
Underidentification test 22.91*** 25.67*** 25.66***
Hansen J statistic
Overidentification test 0.694*** 0.748*** 0.639***
Notes.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
2. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3. Instrumented variables:∆cit−1, ∆c¯it and Labour Change, rit
4. Instruments sets:lag rit, lag2 ∆c¯it, lag ∆nadult, lag ∆nchildren and lag LabourChange
5. Seasonal and annual dummies are included in all the regressions.
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Table 9: Robustness Checks II
Variables Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆c¯it 0.224** 0.192** 0.203*
(0.103) (0.095) (0.104)
∆c¯itsocio demographics -0.093 0.017
(0.172) (0.017)
∆c¯itrandom 0.069 0.015
(0.088) (0.009)
Observations 35,957 35,269 35,495 33,168 34,040
Number of Households 12,064 11,878 11,951 11,384 11,683
Notes.
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
2. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3. Instrumented variables:∆cit−1, ∆c¯it, Labour Change and rit
4. Instruments sets:lag rit, lag2 ∆c¯it, lag ∆nadult, lag ∆nchildren and lag LabourChange
5. Seasonal and annual dummies are included in all the regressions.
6. All estimations include the lag of the consumption of the household, the interest rate and the demographic and labour market
control variables.
7. The different sample size in the estimation is due to the construction of the log of consumption for the new reference groups
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